Japan and the U.S. ‘Beyond Bilateralism’: Introduction

“Challenges to Bilateralism,” T. J. Pempel’s wide-ranging introduction to 2004′s Beyond Bilateralism (which he edited with Ellis S. Krauss) lays out a compelling narrative for post-WWII U.S.–Japan relations. One of modern history’s strongest and most enduring bilateral relationships, he writes, is giving way to a complex network of ties involving other actors: in short, moving “beyond bilateralism.”

The story goes like this: From occupation through the 1980s, the relationship was characterized by common priorities, established means for negotiations in important policy areas (which were kept separate by a tacit “non-linkage rule”), all in an overtly asymmetrical relationship. The countries were on the “same side in the bipolar international arena,” their economies were intimately related, and they shared a commitment to democracy, albeit in different forms.

Since the mid- to late 1980s, Pempel writes, these strictly bilateral relationships have been increasing in complexity and ambiguity. Among the causes for this change are (1) the end of Cold War geopolitics, (2) the development of other Asian economies, coinciding with a huge growth in cross-border capital flow, (3) the rise of regional and global multilateral institutions, and most recently (4) the effects of 9/11 on global politics.

This frame for the book starkly coincides with the perspective of my current line of thinking when Pempel takes on the issue of China as an element of the changed U.S.–Japan arena.

For the three countries, the relationship has clearly become trilateral, as Mochizuki’s analysis in Chapter 3 shows [I will address this soon]. U.S. unilateralism pushes Japan and China closer together, while any warming of ties between either Japan or China on the one hand and the United States on the other forces a re-calibration of interests by the party left out. Japan fears that closer U.S. ties to China may come at Japan’s expense. Japan–China ties remain the triangle’s weakest link, but American policymakers have long worried that closer links between those two countries would come at the expense of American influence in Asia. And as China grows economically, some people in Japan feel similarly threatened, despite the short-term profitability to many Japanese corporations derived from investment in and trade with China. (17, emphasis mine)

This is the most concise statement I have yet seen on the significance of the U.S.–Japan–China triangle as grounds for analysis. (It also courteously underlines the importance of the thesis work I did, phew.) The chapter also demonstrates the importance of taking other actors into account in any set of relations, whether bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral. I look forward to the remainder of this book.

While I get ready to read the rest of this book, here is a brief summary of some other key points:

• Pempel alludes to a U.S. idea that helping Japan to develop economically “was all calculated to assist Japan in becoming an economic success story that could be projected as a model for much of the rest of Asian development.” (7) I wonder whose rhetoric this was.
• There was little unofficial influence on pre-”beyond” U.S.–Japan ties. Non-governmental actors had little pull. (8) Additionally, “Functionally specific agencies in both countries worked with their counterparts on matters within their joint domains relatively independently of agencies dealing with issues in other areas,” (9) meaning that issues were kept separate in negotiations—”a non-linkage rule.”
• Similarly, when disputes arose, the U.S. president or Japanese prime minister rarely engaged in negotiations, instead depending on counterpart bureaucratic organizations, representing “a network of connectors [running] from one country’s government to that of the other.” (11)
• Japan being concerned about increased U.S. engagement with China in the ’90s, 9/11 escalated those concerns. “Japanese concerns were enhanced by the American warming toward China and its SCO [Shanghai Cooperative Organization] allies [Russia and four Central Asian states] as a result of the U.S. post-September 11 antiterrorism campaign, as well as by China’s willingness to utilize the antiterrorism label to justify actions against dissidents.” (16) (The latter concern refers to China’s defining Muslim separatists in Xinjiang Province as terrorists. That may be, but the Uighurs in northwest China are not aligned with any strains of the much feared “global Islam.”)
• President Clinton “personally took the initiative to upgrade the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to include a national leaders’ meeting,” yet the Bush administration has opposed multilateral arrangements. (27)
• Japan has supported regionalism because “after the many trade frictions of the mid- to late 1980s, Japan was anxious to reduce its dependence on the United States and also on those global multilateral organizations in which U.S. influence was overwhelming.” (29) This last point relates to a recent proposal by Japan to study the creation of a massive free trade area that would exclude the United States, which I will examine later.

Book-worm

I have been a good little bibliophile.

• Today I read most of China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files by Andrew Nathan and Bruce Gilley. This book has been a deeply informative backgrounder on the personal histories of the CCP’s top leaders, and it will serve as a fine reference during future readings. I will have more on this when I finish with it—I am particularly impressed by the authors’ candor on the sourcing for the book.
• I began my shopping spree last week when I bought China’s New Rulers and Murakami Haruki’s Kafka on the Shore at Kramerbooks in Dupont Circle.
• The buying continued with a visit to Amazon, which yielded a copy of Embracing Defeat, John Dower’s award-winning history of post-WWII Japan. I’ve read bits and pieces of this book over the last few years, but now I have my own copy. It is up next after China’s New Rulers.
• Between reading sittings today, I shopped for more books. At Idle Time Books next to the cafe Tryst, I finally bought their copy of Living With China: U.S.–China Relations in the Twenty-first Century, edited by Ezra Vogel at Harvard.
• Before returning home I discovered yet another bookstore on a bike-ride through Georgetown. There, I happened upon a truly exceptional used book. In 1989, LDP politician Ishihara Shintaro (who later left the LDP and is now governor of Tokyo) and Sony Chairman Morita Akio co-authored an anti-U.S. nationalist manifesto called The Japan That Can Say ‘No’ （｢ノー｣と言える日本）that was not intended for U.S. publication. A sloppy translation was entered into the Congressional Record and republished by The Jefferson Educational Foundation. That’s the copy that I found. Who cares? Well, most libraries only hold the later, better translation with an introduction by Ezra Vogel, but Morita withdrew his portion of the book before that official English translation because of negative reaction to the unauthorized edition. The unauthorized edition made the rounds in Washington and affected this city’s view of Japan, according to Vogel’s introduction, so the original is a better historical document. The price? Two dollars.
• My last stop was a swing by the Georgetown University library, which mercifully admits anyone with an ID during reasonable hours. There, I was able to download about half a dozen obscure articles I’ve been needing, and I photocopied key chapters from two relatively recent books edited by T.J. Pempel relevant to my research: Remapping East Asia and Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.–Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific (co-edited with Ellis S. Krauss).

Meanwhile in the news, there are two recent diplomatic headlines worth noting, after the jump. more »

N. Korean Warning Over U.S.-South Wargames

Via BBC:

North Korea has threatened to take pre-emptive action in response to US-South Korean military drills currently taking place in the region.

According to the official KCNA news agency, Pyongyang described the drills as “an undisguised military threat” and a “war action”.

US and South Korean troops began the military exercises on Monday.

The drills are an annual event, and the North usually issues a strongly-worded statement against them.

But this year, tensions are higher than normal because of international anger at the North’s recent decision to test-fire a series of missiles.

The North Korean military “reserves the right to undertake a pre-emptive action for self-defence against the enemy, at a crucial time it deems necessary to defend itself”, an army spokesman is quoted as saying by KCNA. [full story]

Zhao Yan, The Times, and U.S. Opinion on China

Without wading into the facts surrounding the case of Zhao Yan, a Chinese researcher for The New York Times who has been locked up for two years over allegations that he leaked state secrets to the newspaper, let’s take a look at how jailing a New York Times journalist might affect U.S. opinion on China.

The Times tends to cover the trevails of its journalists with a practicedly detached tone, but an underlying indignance. We saw it during the downfall of Judy Miller. And we see it here with the much more sympathetic case of Zhao Yan. Jim Yardley writes today:

A Chinese researcher for The New York Times who has been jailed for nearly two years on charges of leaking state secrets to the newspaper may learn the verdict in his case as soon as Friday, according to one of his lawyers.

“It is very likely that they are going to announce a verdict, but there is nothing definite,” the lawyer, Mo Shaoping, said Monday.

The researcher, Zhao Yan, has denied the accusations against him, and The Times has repeatedly denied that he leaked any state secrets to the newspaper. Mr. Zhao, 44, has also said he is innocent of a second, lesser charge of fraud not related to his work for The Times.

In June, Mr. Zhao had a secret trial in which defense witnesses were forbidden from testifying. Without explanation, the authorities have delayed the issuing of a verdict.

The Times has committedly covered the case, and to the extent that it might be viewed as a shaper of U.S. news coverage and opinion, the importance of Zhao’s case has been heightened.

Even the Chinese government tacitly acknowledged the importance of the Zhao case to U.S.-China relations: the charges against him were dropped for a brief period surrounding President Hu Jintao‘s visit to the United States earlier this year. Despite much speculation about a possible release, charges were later reinstated. According to a May 15 Voice of America transcript Mo Shaoping noted that “There is no regulation in Chinese law that provides for another appeal. So, if they do not have any new evidence and they make another appeal on Zhao Yan’s case, it is illegal.”

President Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and others brought up the Zhao case directly with Chinese authorities. I wonder if this would have happened for an AP stringer, or even a Los Angeles Times researcher. It is not far-fetched to imagine that the special status of the Times and its decision to sustain coverage of the affair elevated Zhao’s case over others. But are U.S. readers paying attention? The involvement of high government officials surrounding Hu’s visit certainly brought the case to the attention of the foreign policy elite, but otherwise this is likely another case of enraptured navelgazing on the part of U.S. journalists. Who really gave a damn what happened to Judy Miller, after all?

UPDATE 2006.08.24 22:23 EDT: Zhao has been sentenced to three years in prison, Reuters reports.

Aso Says He Would Improve Ties With China and S. Korea

The same day that he declared his candidacy for LDP president (and presumably prime minister) Japanese Foreign Minister Aso Taro said he would work to improve ties with China and South Korea if he becomes prime minister. Aso is viewed as a long-shot candidate in the Sept. 20 election, with Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo the presumptive winner.

“Having no meetings between leaders at all is a distorted form of diplomacy and we must correct this,” Aso said, according to Reuters. Aso has been more flexible than Abe on the Yasukuni Shrine question. He has even proposed that the shrine be re-nationalized as a secular war memorial. Some have remarked that the proposal is insane, but to my mind, Aso has apparently been relatively shrewd in his handling of the Yasukuni issue. By renationalizing the shrine, the government would wrest control of the symbolic site from the private Shinto authorities who enshrined the war criminals in the first place and currently administer the controversial Yushukan war museum.

Meanwhile, Aso struck a familiar nationalist note when announcing his proposal, saying “the tens of thousands of soldiers who died crying ‘Long Life to the Emperor’ filled those words with deep emotion, so I strongly pray that the emperor can visit Yasukuni.” This last statement is no personal sentiment. The special status of Yasukuni Shrine as the place where the emperor, who was at the time considered holy, prayed for war dead was fundamental to its rise in importance during what Japan called the Greater East Asian War. When the Meiji authorities built the shrine on Kudan Hill, across the street from the imperial palace grounds, proximity to the emperor was key.

By taking control away from the Shinto authorities and at the same time encouraging an emperor’s visit, Aso might be appealing to both sides of the Yasukuni debate. Abe appeals only to the nationalists on the issue.
But there is still no indication that disenshrining the war criminals is possible, and even before he introduced this new plan, Aso was agitating for Emperor Akihito to visit the shrine. If Hirohito stopped visiting the shrine after it was tarnished by the war criminals (as was recently confirmed by newly available documents), why would Akihito reverse this decision?

Family Feud

Via David Marx’s Neomarxisme:

Even though Abe Shinzo’s got a lock on the Prime Minister election, Foreign Minister Aso Taro formally announced his candidacy today. The two men are cousins, by the way, linked to several former Prime Ministers and the Imperial family. Thanks to the family tree on this page, we can better understand which side of the eternal political dynasty will be ruling Japan in the near future.

Aso is grandson of post-war PM Yoshida Shigeru (’46-’47, ’48-’54), and his sister is married to the son of Emperor Hirohito’s younger brother Prince Mikasanomiya. Aso’s wife is the daughter of PM Suzuki Zenko (’80-’82). Yoshida Shigeru shares the same grandfather as PMs Kishi Nobusuke (’57-’60) and Sato Eisaku (’67-’72) – who are brothers! Abe is the grandson of Kishi.

Anti-Japan Protests Restrained After Yasukuni Visit

Japan’s Mainichi Shimbun reports with little specific information that Chinese anti-Japan groups have heeded Chinese governmental injuctions against protesting Koizumi‘s Aug. 15 visit to Yasukuni Shrine.

After last year’s anti-Japan demonstrations in many parts of China, the Chinese government might be hoping to avoid a repeat. Last year’s demonstrations, which at first emerged in the context of Japan’s bid (along with India) to join the U.N. Security Council, quickly widened to include boycott efforts targeting Japanese business and large-scale public demonstrations. Chinese authorities at the time first cited Yasukuni, which was mostly out of the news during the 14 months since Koizumi’s previous visit, at the same time they made efforts to temper public rallies. These efforts included ordering Chinese media not to cover demonstrations and sending text messages to Chinese mobile phone customers warning against unauthorized gatherings.

My undergraduate thesis, which I will post soon, argues that the effect of the Chinese deployment of the Yasukuni controversy in public rhetoric last April helped guide the bilateral tensions down a well worn path: Koizumi’s repeated shrine visits produced a familiar ground for Sino-Japanese historical disputes, one where tensions are pronounced, yet predictable.

Chinese government efforts to keep anti-Japan demonstrators off the streets most likely reflect the regime’s constant interest in stability. Though to the extent that the CCP draws legitimacy from nationalist sentiment in its anti-Japan manifestation, discouraging anti-Japan expression could be risky. Keeping the peace and preventing public unrest that might threaten the stability of the regime and regional economic ties is important, but so might be maintaining a culture of national pride connected to the CCP.

Certainly, without more detailed information than the short Mainichi article, it is impossible to know.

Abe, MoFA Aim For High-Level Meetings

Japan’s Foreign Ministry is looking to arrange high-level meetings with South Korean and Chinese officials in November at the APEC forum in Hanoi and at the ASEAN+3 meeting in December.

The lead candidate for LDP president, Abe Shinzo, said on Aug. 3 he would work as prime minister to resume top-level summits with Chinese leaders. “To avoid single issues from affecting the overall development of Japan-China relations, we need constructive discussion through direct dialogue,” he said.

Brief: Japan In ASEAN+3 Logistics Push

KUALA LUMPUR, Aug 17 — Japan will push for a joint study with Asean on an efficient regional logistic network which includes a future logistic map between Asean and China, Japan and South Korea in efforts to expedite and enhance the movement of goods within the region.

Japan, a key dialogue partner of Asean with extensive trade and business involvement in the region’s economies, wants a significant enhancement in logistic capabilities in the region so as to reap maximum benefits from the increasing free trade pacts with the 10-member organisation, an Asean diplomat said Thursday. [more | Bernama]

This may not be huge, but it shows that Japan continues to work on its regional influence even as relations with China and South Korea are tense over Koizumi’s public actions.

Brief: Taiwanese Protesters Warned Off Islands

Japanese authorities told a Taiwanese fishing boat approaching the Pinnacle Islands* to turn back and mobilized security forces to prevent its approach. The boat is thought to be carrying a dozen activists on a trip to protest Koizumi’s Aug. 15 Yasukuni Shrine visit. Some anti-Japan activists in Hong Kong had planned a similar trip, but delayed their departure to get their boats ready. [AFP via Yahoo!]

*The islands are known as Senkaku Shotō (尖閣諸島) in Japanese and Diàoyútái Qúndǎo (钓鱼台群岛) in Chinese. I use the name Pinnacle Islands for neutrality.