At least measured by the crude “word count” metric, China is mentioned five times, just over last year. Like last year, Japan escapes mention entirely, except as part of the phrase “oldest alliances in Europe and Asia.” (“Japan passing” may still be in style.) [UPDATE: "Tokyo" snuck in there once in a laundry list of places, but I'll still keep the rating at zero.]

India, mentioned once last year, gets no love. Asia is mentioned twice (once as “Asian”).

Korea, mentioned seven times in 2011, comes up once (trade agreement).

Europe gets one mention (with Japan Asia), versus two last year.

More to come.

Pei writes:

One may be tempted to blame leadership failure for the premature demise of China’s reform. While this is certainly a cause, a far more critical factor is more responsible: the CCP’s political objective of reform is fundamentally incompatible with a market economy.

No one understood why China needed to reform its economy better than Deng himself. In 1992, as in 1978, He knew that only market-oriented reforms could save the CCP. Although Deng was sure about the political objective of his reforms, he never explicitly endorsed a capitalist market economy as the end goal. Here lies the fundamental flaw of China’s reform project: as long as pro-market reforms are used as a means to preserve the political monopoly of the CCP, such reforms are doomed to fail.

He argues that the party has low incentive to reform past the point that makes them rich: “The moment the CCP’s rule is more secure due to improved economic performance, its ruling elites would lose incentives for further reform.”

This brand of “crony capitalism,” he writes, is only possible “post-communist autocracy is in charge of a half-reformed economy.” Not an optimistic column for those who hope for reform.

“Ai Weiwei: Never Sorry” is something I’m looking forward to, but for now we can still see the Frontline version, a new New York Times excerpt, and Ali’s piece on Ai’s time in New York.

In the spirit of the year of the dragon, here’s a picture of 2008 fireworks at Three Shadows Photography Art Centre in Beijing, a building designed by Ai.

Chinese New Year 2008 at Three Shadows, by Graham Webster

Second, via Angel Hsu, this image depicting what is most likely a huge cloud of noxious firecracker emissions as Beijing celebrated the new year (which, being lunar, coincided with the new moon). Beijing has promised to provide real-time data on PM-2.5 (particle matter under 2.5 microns), thought to be a category of pollution that acutely threatens human health.

The U.S. embassy in Beijing has for years offered live data from a sensor in its compound, and the addition of the Chinese data is welcomed. Just look at that spike!

Click for full size.

(To see for yourself, visit http://zx.bjmemc.com.cn/ and click on the PM2.5 tab.)

In the face of sanctions, Iran has had one relatively stable customer in China, but The Telegraph reports today that China has reduced its oil purchases and expressed firm opposition to Iran developing nuclear weapons.

“China adamantly opposes Iran developing and possessing nuclear weapons,” [Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao] said. …

The Washington Post reported that China trimmed its oil imports from Iran in January from a daily average of around 550,000 barrels to 285,000 barrels a day. …

“Iran would not have wanted China to make this statement, but Iran must understand that if it comes down to a choice China will not alienate itself from the rest of the world for the sake of single country,” said Yu Guoqing, a researcher on the Middle East at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. [full story]

This is an interesting year for international relations. The world may not end (notwithstanding the brief absence of Wikipedia), but presidential elections in the United States and Russia, a leadership transition in China, and parliamentary elections in Iran all make for less predictability.

[UPDATE Sun Jan 22 00:41:06 EST 2012] WSJ writes: “China’s imports from Iran could decline in the months ahead due to a dispute over commercial issues between China International United Petroleum & Chemicals Co., known as Unipec, and National Iranian Oil Co. Unipec has skipped imports of about 220,000 barrels a day from Iran in January and further delays could affect February orders as well.” So, though the international context continues to exist, there are of course other things going on…

It would have been the most expensive political ad buy in the history of the world. Google’s search engine, the most visited website in the world, displays a black block over its logo. Wikipedia, the sixth most visited site globally, has disabled its English-language service. This unprecedented action to oppose legislation under consideration in the US Congress signals the importance of the private sector in Internet policy – and it won’t stop here.

Private companies are almost entirely responsible for your ability to read this article. The text travelled through a purchased operating system, over an enterprise office network, through privately-owned wires and fibre optic cables, and finally reached the privately-run “cloud” service in which it was composed. If you’re overseas from Al Jazeera’s servers, the message also travelled through privately-owned undersea cables-the bedrock of international communication and finance.

Many experts, including Jonathan Zittrain of Harvard and the leaders of the MIT Media Lab, have described in detail the threat to free speech, innovation, and the technology business posed by the legislation: the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in the House and the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA) in the Senate. Most people, however, learned of the controversy through today’s online demonstrations, in which the online goliaths of our day have filled the picket lines.

Read the rest at Al Jazeera English.

Q: You once said that the first two essays were padding, while the last essay was the end goal?
A: If you only write the last essay (including <My 2011>), it will surely be deleted.  When something gets deleted, it has no value.  You can boast on the heroes’ honor roll that you wrote another censored essay and that you were victimized once again.  Many rightists rank themselves on the basis of the degree of persecution.  This is a somewhat pathetic ranking.  The ultimate height in sexual intercourse is the climax.  You cannot let someone climax as soon as they read it.   You need your padding.

南都周刊：你曾说前面两篇文章是铺垫，后面一篇才是目的？

韩寒：你光写后面一篇文章，包括现在的《我的2011》，肯定会被删掉的。当一个东西被删掉了，就没有什么价值了，也只能在英雄谱上把自己说得更牛一点— 老子又写了一篇被删掉的文章，老子是受害者。很多右派是按照被迫害的程度来排资历高低的，他们已经形成了一种比较病态的排序。性爱的最高境界就是高潮，你不能让人家直接看完就到高潮了，你得有你的铺垫。

The interview is a good read, as Han Han takes on the rightists, the leftists, and the intellectuals.

The three essays in question: “On Revolution,” “On Democracy,” and “On Freedom“—followed by “My 2011.” Each of these was translated and posted on Roland Soong’s indispensable East South West North.

First a caveat: I am not a specialist in Chinese–African relations, and I have only a passing familiarity with the issues and personalities involved here. Nonetheless, there are a few things I can say based on Brautigam’s report.

The original commentary speculated (in the headline) that the Zambezi Valley in Mozambique might be “China’s first agricultural colony,” and Brautigam notes that the report became influential in China–Africa discussions. “The problem,” she writes: “very little of what was written in this sensational commentary appears to be real” (emphasis original). Indeed, she argues that many of the most prominent claims in the commentary either conflict with data or seem to be based on rumors. In some cases, interviews in Mozambique even failed to turn up people familiar with the rumors.

The full post is worth a read, but two things jump out at me.

The role of peer review. Brautigam notes that the CSIS piece was not subject to peer review, but what caught my attention was the sense that peer review is not necessarily effective in this situation. Indeed, a reviewer told Brautigam to better account for the “research” by Loro Horta that she finds so lacking. This is a reminder that peer review can sustain misguided ideas as well as quash them.

Now just who are we talking about? The assumptions of agency built in to the Horta piece, as excerpted by Brautigam, could potentially be their own red flag. “China” is framed as an actor, often a unitary one, in discussing the supposed involvement of Chinese interests in Mozambique:

China has been requesting large land leases to establish Chinese-run mega-farms and cattle ranches. … China is committed to transforming Mozambique into one of its main food suppliers …An analysis of China’s activities in the valley in the past two years provides some strong indication of China’s long term intentions.

When commentary lacks precision regarding who’s doing what among the roughly one-fifth of the world that lives in China, and instead frames the country as a unitary actor with “intentions” or “activities,” it’s unclear to me how much actual information can be communicated. At best, the reader is supposed to trust the writer to simplify with understanding and integrity. Explaining the specific mechanics is a far more persuasive way to go, and if the specifics are unclear, the honest move is to explain what is left uncertain.

Creative Commons photo by saucy_pan

Noted, from ChinaSolved (emphasis mine):

When Huntsman says, “America First” he means “and not China”.

His message is that he’s seen what can happen if the global status quo doesn’t shift – and that this is scary to the US.  Moreover, he’s in a position to do something about it.  He has seen the enemy – or at least the rival – and it’s China.

This is the new expat message.  In the 2000s,  China pros said “I can open that China opportunity”.  In the coming decade, their  line will be, “I can help you keep the Chinese at bay.”

I don’t have time to evaluate this, but such a shift would be interesting, if unsettling. My initial sense is that there have always been “China experts” who said they would defend the United States and others “against” China. The difference now may be that those people are being drawn from the ranks of individuals who actually speak Chinese and have actually been there.

This kind of stance is only possible if you have a very dark strategic view or if you never spent enough time speaking with people to lose the fear narrative. Expat enclaves can only encourage this us–them viewpoint.

See also, from 2008, my take on the Trans-Pacific Express cable, which had just gained U.S. approval. A map from the Technology Review: