I think this may be the final impetus for my trip to Japan: Among Björk’s newly announced tourdates:
02-19 Tokyo, Japan - Budokan
02-22 Tokyo, Japan - Budokan
02-25 Osaka, Japan - Osaka Castle Hall
Fukuda tells the Washington Post that Asia is Japan’s top responsibility, sending a signal to the United States on Japan’s expired Afghanistan refueling mission. This is also a departure from Abe and Aso’s aspiration to “Eurasian” reach.
It wasn’t too long ago that then-Foreign Minister Aso Taro declared that Japan would work for an “arc of freedom and prosperity” (自由と繁栄の弧) reaching across the Eurasian landmass. Aso’s rhetoric, which was to set out a foreign policy framework for the newly minted premiership of Abe Shinzo, made some people uncomfortable because of its echoes of history—no doubt partially because of Abe and Aso’s general hawkishness.
Now, after the implosion of the Abe government and the rocky start for Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo, a man who was initially seen as an agent for stability, Japan is changing its foreign policy footing. Ahead of Fukuda’s first visit to the United States as prime minister, he gave an interview to the Washington Post. “I believe the heaviest responsibility for Japan is to see to it that there is stability and prosperity in Asia,” Fukuda said, while also calling the U.S.–Japan alliance the “very foundation” of his foreign policy.
Japanese-U.S. ties have been destabilized (if only slightly) recently by the refusal of the Japanese legislature, where the upper house is controlled by Japan’s opposition, to renew Japan’s refueling mission in support of a primarily U.S. military action in Afghanistan. Predictably, this drew attention from U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates on his trip to Asia last week. But as Tobias Harris writes, changes in China loom large in the U.S.–Japan alliance. Here’s Tobias, quoting Gates’ speech last week at Sofia University in Tokyo:
Most pressingly, the alliance has yet to coordinate an approach to China. To some, it is a bulwark against China. To others—and I think it’s safe to include Mr. Gates in this category—the stronger the U.S.–Japan alliance, the better able it will be to reach out to China and work on incorporating China into the regional security architecture. As Mr. Gates says of China, “I do not see China as a strategic adversary. It is a competitor in some respects and partner in others. While we candidly acknowledge our differences, it is important to strengthen communications and to engage the Chinese on all facets of our relationship to build mutual understanding and confidence.”
Fukuda’s emphasis on Asia, if not an isolated statement, could represent at least an orientation toward improving its relations with regional powers. It certainly would seem to reflect the reality of Japanese politics over involvement with U.S. military action.
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Footnote: Gates’ not-adversary-but-competitor line also reminds me of Obama, for what it’s worth.
This presentation came over H-Japan and may be of interest to Transpacifica readers in Tokyo.
The 17th TransAsian Cultural Studies Seminar
“Cultural Migrants”
by Fujita Yuiko (Keio University)
(Please note that presentation will be made in Japanese)Date & time: 5-7pm, Dec 7th 2007
Venue: Room 418, 19th Bldg. of Waseda University
(http://www.waseda.jp/jp/campus/nishiwaseda.html)Abstract::
In recent years, a large number of young Japanese have been migrating to Western cities such as New York City and London, in order to engage themselves in cultural production in the fields of arts, fashion, dance, music, etc. How can we account for the factors of this young Japanese migration? Following Arjun Appadurai’s theory of the relation between media and migration, I explore how images of Western countries constructed by the media (transnational flows of media) lead young Japanese to migrate to the West (transnational flows of people). I also look at how they renegotiate their sense of Japaneseness after migration. By using ‘multi-sited ethnography’, I followed the migration process of twenty-two young people from Tokyo to New York City/London (and to Tokyo) over five years.
Are Japanese people so afraid of street crime that they’d try to blend in as a vending machine? Well, an artist with an ironic streak and a good sense for reporter manipulation convinced The New York Times last month that they are. Ampontan responds in kind.
The Times article reported on work by the artist Tsukioka Aya (月岡彩): a set of collapsible vending machine suits, in case you want to blend in on the street. Aside from considering a 2003 work of art a contemporary trend, the Times‘ Martin Fackler swallows Tsukioka’s bait and prints her artist’s narrative verbatim.
To get the reader’s attention, Fackler declares that the suits “are greeted here with straight faces” (doubtful) and includes a truly indefensible “nut graf” full of classic tropes about “the Japanese”:
These elaborate defenses are coming at a time when crime rates are actually declining in Japan. But the Japanese, sensitive to the slightest signs of social fraying, say they feel growing anxiety about safety, fanned by sensationalist news media. Instead of pepper spray, though, they are devising a variety of novel solutions, some high-tech, others quirky, but all reflecting a peculiarly Japanese sensibility.
Let’s be fair to Fackler. The article later does acknowledge that these pieces are examples of chindōgu (珍道具, “strange tools”), a movement of odd-ball inventions that Ampontan points out has both Japanese- and English-language websites. (I’ll also allow for the possibility that Fackler submitted a less credulous story that editors changed to emphasize the crime angle.)
It’s the truly credulous tone at the top of the article that leads Ampontan to declare the Times deceased, its present operations being merely postmortem spasms. Read it.
I’ve been busy recently in Beijing and watching a lot of good stories go right by. You’ll forgive a Colorado native for using a baseball analogy: It’s time to make sure I don’t strike out looking. Here’s a quick summary of transpacific pitches I wish I’d had time to swing at.
GOFA’s intentions are honorable in many ways. I think many of the people who support it certainly have honorable intentions. I know and respect many of them, despite having had some pretty heated arguments with some members of the human rights groups who say they support it for strategic reasons. But from where I sit in Hong Kong, this proposed legislation comes off as something that my Chinese friends who hate censorship and surveillance would find arrogant, patronizing, and interventionist, with the likely result that it would kill U.S. tech companies’ ability to do business in China in the first place - a result which by the way they don’t think would enhance their freedom.
Clinton says the U.S.-China relationship will be the world’s “most important bilateral.” What should Japan think?
The main candidates for U.S. president are all contributing essays on their foreign policy vision to Foreign Affairs, and Sen. Hillary Clinton (as well as Sen. John McCain) came up this issue. Tobias Harris, in an entry called “The Vanishing Ally,” notices that Clinton made a bold statement, putting the U.S. relationship with China at the top of her list of priorities.
“Our relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world in this century,” Clinton writes. She continues:
The United States and China have vastly different values and political systems, yet even though we disagree profoundly on issues ranging from trade to human rights, religious freedom, labor practices, and Tibet, there is much that the United States and China can and must accomplish together. China’s support was important in reaching a deal to disable North Korea’s nuclear facilities. We should build on this framework to establish a Northeast Asian security regime.
But China’s rise is also creating new challenges. The Chinese have finally begun to realize that their rapid economic growth is coming at a tremendous environmental price. The United States should undertake a joint program with China and Japan to develop new clean-energy sources, promote greater energy efficiency, and combat climate change. This program would be part of an overall energy policy that would require a dramatic reduction in U.S. dependence on foreign oil.
We must persuade China to join global institutions and support international rules by building on areas where our interests converge and working to narrow our differences. Although the United States must stand ready to challenge China when its conduct is at odds with U.S. vital interests, we should work for a cooperative future.
Dealing with China is just one of many issues Clinton’s essay lists as challenges for the next president (some others—two wars, Iran, “a resurgent Russia,” threats to Israel and oil supplies in the Middle East, climate change, and possible global epidemics). But consider this quick count of the most-mentioned countries. The count includes adjectival forms, so “China” and “Chinese” would both be counted.
| Country | Mentions |
| Iraq | 33 |
| Iran | 15 |
| China | 13 |
| Afghanistan | 12 |
| Russia | 12 |
| Israel | 7 |
| India | 5 |
| Sudan/Darfur | 4 |
| North Korea | 3 |
| Palestine* | 3 |
| Japan, Kosovo*, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, Tibet* | 2 each |
| Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Zimbabwe | 1 each |
| *These places or their descriptors are used separately from the states that claim to govern the territories. Also, Hamburg, Germany, and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, were each mentioned once. | |
(This counting exercise I admit can be a bit silly; it threatens to elevate a Foreign Affairs piece to the level of the State of the Union. But it can demonstrate just how high on the public agenda China has risen, at least in the mind of Clinton’s foreign policy writing.)
Regarding the statement that the U.S.–China relationship is the century’s most important, Tobias writes, “That may be disconcerting for Japan, used to hearing U.S. officials insist on the importance of the U.S.–Japan relationship, but it also happens to be true.” He adds later, “[T]he U.S.–Japan relationship could be an essential part of the U.S. approach to China, helping smooth China’s ascension to regional and global leadership (and hold China accountable). Senator Clinton hints at this—she mentions cooperation on clean energy—but no policymaker or presidential candidate has discussed a Sino–U.S.–Japanese triangle.”
Given that the Sino–Japanese–U.S. triangle was my blogging bailiwick for an entire year, I can confirm that, indeed, no one talks much about this. But I don’t go as far as Tobias when it comes to actually fearing the U.S. government under a new administration would forsake Japan. Japan remains essential to the United States as a security and economic partner. All sides of the triangle need both security and business relations to remain smooth throughout the trilateral. It may be the case the Clinton and her campaign simply decided against giving much space to reiterating the U.S. relationship with Japan in this particular essay. It looks to me from the table as if some countries were included in the essay as a political hat-tip (see especially the passage on Latin America, where the Bush administration is scolded for inattention but Clinton offers little other than a laundry list of nations).
My main message here is that this is a campaign document, not so much a policy proposal. It may have been a bit of a diplomatic gaffe not to give Japan a little more space, but I doubt the omission will have any adverse effect on the campaign. On the other hand, when China-related issues inevitably come up in force during the Olympics in August 2008, just three months before the general election, it will be key for candidates to have a record on China. Barring any unforeseen disasters, Japan will not likely be a major topic in U.S. media coverage leading up to the election.
China’s “one-child policy” will likely lead to a fast increase of the retired portion of the population. In the United States and Japan (and many other countries) this means trouble for national pension systems. China won’t have this problem: There is no universal pension system. But the institution traditionally responsible for care of elders, the family, is changing rapidly, and one effect may be an erosion of trust in society.
Through the lively academic blog orgtheory.net, I found the work of Nicholas Eberstadt, a scholar based at the American Enterprise Institute. Writing at orgtheory.net, UCLA sociologist Gabriel Rossman picked up on an op-ed Eberstadt wrote for The Wall Street Journal in which he declares that the Chinese government is creating a great problem for itself with its population-control policy. One illustrative estimate he makes is that in 20 years, one-third of Chinese women over 60 will not have a living son, meaning many women will have to find other ways to get support in old age.
What really caught my attention here is a point made by Rossman: Once people born under the “one-child policy” have their own kids, people will have no blood-relations in the same generation. Not only will there be no siblings (that’s not so remarkable), there will also be no aunts or uncles. And with no aunts or uncles, there are no cousins. As generations pass, the closest intragenerational relations will be cousins one-removed, then twice-, then thrice-.
Eberstadt writes that China is regarded as a “low-trust society.” This means that people have low latent trust and rely on networks of trust—the famous guanxi, or “relationships”—to feel confident in all manner of social activities, from business transactions to personal relations. Thus the elimination of large family networks represents a considerable reduction in the size of individuals’ trust networks.
All right, you might say, so now people will just have to make friends outside the family. That’s true, but there are two problems. First, Rossman notes that family members can’t be replaced—”you can stop talking to your brother, but you can’t recruit a new brother to replace him.” Second, people will still be able to make friends outside the family, but they won’t be able to depend on a network of “family friends” when there’s no network of family. Myself, I lack siblings, but my parents have three each. Most of them got married and have children. Through absolutely no effort, I’ve been given a large network of people who might help me out of a bind: my relatives and in a real pinch, possibly even their friends.
So who’s going to help Chinese people out of a pinch when this effect sets in? Well, there are of course those personal friends. Also, in my short experience in Beijing, I have noticed my hutong neighborhood has a good deal of trust. People lend each other bikes, look out for each other’s security, and help each other get some practical things done. In language, people often refer to close (or sometimes not-so-close) friends using familial terms. (The practice of calling folks “comrade” has faded for the young, and the term is now a euphemism for homosexuals.) But what network of trust is going to secure business transactions? An increase in the rule of law would likely have that effect. If rules are enforced and public authorities are more available to mediate disputes between parties with no relationship, then a wider trust could set in.
Social engineers, if they had arbitrary power to change society, might even study Japan’s “high-trust” society to see just how it works that lost wallets on Tokyo subways are often turned in with money intact to the nearest station. Many scholars speculate that Japan’s identity as a national family (国家, kokka) headed by the emperor, and a level of ethnic homogeneity much higher than the P.R.C., fed into this. If that’s the case, its notable that China has not developed greater trust with similar national rhetoric (if dissimilar domestic government behavior). Certainly, something other than the rhetoric must be at work.
Jun Okumura writes (last item):
Nikkei, Yomiuri and Asahi are collaborating on a joint website, joint distribution, and joint emergency production. Other newspapers are also welcome to join the party. At the same time, MSN has ditched Mainichi (or is it the other way around?) for Sankei. Whatever. Just give the world a deeper archive, so I won’t have to keep copying the articles to my hard disk.
That would certainly be a grand coalition, much larger than any U.S. joint operating agreement (JOA) such as those between the Denver newspapers and others—this list is old, but it gives an idea. I haven’t been able to find more information on this with a quick search, but these papers could definitely use a better online archive presence, as Jun suggests. Factiva isn’t exactly free to all.
UPDATE 2007/10/4 19:11: Here is Yomiuri’s announcement on the emerging JOA. For the record, Yomiuri and Asahi are the world’s largest newspapers by circulation, and Nikkei is fourth. Their combined circulation is more than 30 million.
[This is the first of what I hope will be many posts on Latin America by my friend and frequent collaborator Dorothy Kronick. Dorothy's reporting from Caracas, Venezuela, where she was a Fulbright Scholar, was published in The New Republic, The American Prospect, and the Chilean business magazine AméricaEconomía. She now lives in Buenos Aires, Argentina. –Graham]
Monday marked the one-year birthday of China’s free trade agreement (FTA) with Chile, the first such agreement between China and a Latin American nation. Both Chile and China had reason to celebrate the occasion: bilateral trade has increased nearly 100 percent since the agreement went into effect, driven largely by the sale of Chilean copper to conductor-hungry China. For the first time, China surpassed the United States as the principal customer for Chilean goods, purchasing $5 billion, or 15 percent, of Chile’s exports (in 2000, Chile sent just 5 percent of its exports to China).
The China-Chile FTA is just one of Chile’s new ties to Asia. On September 3, Michele Bachelet and Abe Shinzo signed an FTA that will eliminate the vast majority of tariffs between Chile and Japan. Trade between Chile and South Korea has increased 232 percent since the implementation of a bilateral FTA three years ago. Chile, Brunei, New Zealand, and Singapore increased their trade flows with the “Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement” last year. Later this month, Chile and China will discuss deepening their trade relationship by opening services markets. And there are more deals to be had. Latin America’s strongest and most dynamic economy has a lot to offer its Pacific Rim trade partners, and vice-versa.
Japan’s history problem (歴史問題, rekishi mondai) is well-known in Asia, and it’s a common topic of discussion in Japanese political journals. Many are familiar with international criticism of Japan’s reckoning with its 20th century aggression, and the repeated approval by the Education Ministry of textbooks that underplay or gloss over the Nanjing Massacre and other incidents has been a cause for diplomatic and public protests in China since the 1980s.
Most recently, in April 2005, Beijing saw what media* reported to be the largest protest the city had seen since 1989. Anti-Japan demonstrations in 2005 began with an online petition against Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but a quieter campaign was in the works calling for a boycott of Japanese businesses that they said supported a nationalist group in Japan known as the Committee to Make New History Textbooks (新しい歴史教科書を作る会, atarashii rekishi kyoukasho wo tsukuru kai)—Tsukurukai for short.
Then, a new edition of Tsukurukai’s textbook was approved by the Education Ministry. This coincided with an shift in the rhetoric of both the Chinese government and demonstrators in Beijing and elsewhere. The highest estimates of how many attended the largest Beijing protest were around 20,000.
But, the Japanese textbook protest does not oppose denials of Japanese atrocities outside of Japan…
This week in Japan’s distant island prefecture of Okinawa, 110,000 people reportedly turned out to protest the removal of language from seven history textbooks. The passage in question has to do with whether a mass suicide by Okinawans occurred with “military coercion.” (Coercion is a key term these days in Japanese historical politics. Abe Shinzo tried to get himself out of trouble over his “comfort women” statements by squabbling over the definition of “coercion.”)
I have not studied the Okinawa incident in question, nor have I watched closely the politics behind this dispute, so I can’t speak to the facts. But here are some other places to look:
The size of demonstrations isn’t usually of great interest to me, but it certainly is useful to remember that Japanese textbooks don’t just rile Chinese and Koreans.
* This was mentioned in various places. Here’s one. Jiangtao Shi and Jane Cai, “Japanese Warned to Avoid Campuses; Embassy Urges Its Citizens to Stay Away after Call on Students to Protest in Beijing Today,” South China Morning Post, April 9, 2005.
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