Export license granted for U.S. imaging tech in Chinese telescope

An extra-high resolution sensor built for the U.S. Naval Observatory is now part of a Chinese mission to put an observatory in Antarctica. The use of the U.S. technology, however, was uncertain.

According to a South China Morning Post article (subscription required), the U.S. government considered whether the sensor counted as a civilian-military “dual use” technology, which would make its export to China problematic.

Digital cameras in civilian use typically range up to 12 megapixels, but the CCD shipped to China by California-based Semiconductor Technology Associates (STA) has a capacity of 100 megapixels, suitable for producing extra-high-definition photos of the sky. However, when not gazing at distant galaxies, a sensitive telescope equipped with STA’s imager could be used to track, identify and lock onto enemy countries’ satellites orbiting the earth.

The device is so sensitive that the NOAC scientists thought the administration of US President Barack Obama might declare the imager to be dual-use technology, meaning it could have both civilian and military applications, and would therefore be refused an export licence to China.

[…]

One reason the US administration may have approved the STA 1600′s export to China is that the device captures only visible light and is blind to infrared radiation, [STA President Richard Bredthauer] said.

An infrared sensitive CCD can be used on spy satellites that see in the dark and can distinguish civilian installations from military ones. Bredthauer declined to comment on whether a CCD that was sensitive only to visible light could also be used for military purposes. [emphasis added]

The export to China of imaging technology used for surveillance and hardware used for internet filtering is controversial, as some argue that U.S. firms should be barred from profiting from surveillance in authoritarian countries.

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Hu Jintao says foreigners out to ‘westernize’ China

This from the AFP via the South China Morning Post (subscription only):

“Hostile international powers are strengthening their efforts to Westernise and divide us,” Hu wrote in the article, noting “ideological and cultural fields” are their main targets.

“We must be aware of the seriousness and complexity of the struggles and take powerful measures to prevent and deal with them.”

Hu also called for greater efforts to develop Chinese culture to meet the “growing spiritual and cultural demands of the people” in the mainland.

“The overall strength of Chinese culture and its international influence is not commensurate with China’s international status,” Hu said.

“The international culture of the West is strong while we are weak.”

With so many debates over the years about “American exceptionalism,” this presents an opportunity to remind us that a Chinese exceptionalism can be seen as a pillar of Chinese politics.

Then again, what country is not convinced it is exceptional?

UPDATE: Ed Wong of The New York Times adds a story.

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On the weaponization of information technology: a great paragraph

From Milton Mueller, amidst a controversial pair of blog posts on activism directed toward blocking the diffusion of information and communication technology that can be used for surveillance, a great paragraph:

For the past five years, some of us have been challenging the rampant securitization of the Internet by a cyber-military-industrial complex still looking for a replacement for the Cold War. The key rhetorical and political ploy used by these forces is to equate the diffusion and ubiquity of information technologies with weapons proliferation, and thus to equate an open and free information infrastructure with national weakness. The implication is that empowering civil society with access to information technology is dangerous, and needs to be checked and regulated by the state. Such an approach is routinely used by cyber-nationalists to limit and block access, and to justify surveillance and interception of communications. Indeed, if the metaphor is accepted it can only lead in that direction.

That was from the second post.

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Why talk of a U.S.–China ‘Cyber Cold War’ is nonsense

When anti-China rhetoric combines with computer security paranoia, we get outlandish statements and alarmism. In my first piece for Al Jazeera English, I argue that the idea of a “Cyber Cold War” is a hallucination:

In January 2010, a Google executive announced “a new approach to China” in a blog post, revealing that the firm had “detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack… originating from China” and that it would reconsider business operations there. In the ensuing two years, US rhetoric about China and cyber security has become ever more breathless.

“China is waging a quiet, mostly invisible but massive cyberwar against the United States,” wrote the Washington Post editorial board earlier this month. A Bloomberg News headline summed up concerns about attacks on corporate targets by conjuring an “undeclared cyber cold war.”

Computer systems in government and the private sector are indeed vulnerable to unauthorised access, as seen in the recent report of an allegedly China-based incursion at the US Chamber of Commerce. People who gain access can exfiltrate data, insert false information, or further tamper with systems for a variety of purposes. But the notion of a cyber cold war with China is inaccurate and irresponsible. [more]

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China cutting under-employed college majors: paranoid or good policy?

Laurie Burkitt for the WSJ reports the Chinese Ministry of Education has announced plans to phase out college majors that don’t get people employed. Emphasis mine:

Yet the government’s decision to curb majors is facing resistance. Many university professors in China are unhappy with the Ministry of Education’s move, as it will likely shrink the talent pool needed for various subjects, such as biology, that are critical to the country’s aim of becoming a leader in science and technology but do not currently have a strong market demand, a report in the state-run China Daily report said.

An op-ed in the Beijing News criticizes the approach for a different reason, saying that it will only spur false reporting of employment rates from schools that are looking for greater autonomy to produce more diversified, higher qualified students.

These seem like pretty good critiques of a policy aimed at reducing the number of unhappy, unemployed, college-educated young people in China.

Could it be that these drawbacks are considered “worth it” by officials concerned about the size of a disenfrancised bourgeoisie, or is it just that such a narrative is so deeply ingrained in my Western-social-science-educated skull that I can’t spot the good intentions?

Or, could it be that the government is accomodating actual people rather than development goals or the ephemeral goal of gathering accurate statistics?

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Fukuyama’s evolution problem

I haven’t read Francis Fukuyama’s most recent book, but I like this point made by John Gray in a TNR review.

THE NOTION THAT ONLY one type of government can in the future be legitimate is as far-fetched as the idea that history has literally come to a halt. To be sure, it is not a thesis that can be falsified, since it is not really an empirical claim. In The Origins of Political Order, Fukuyama is explicit that he is applying evolutionary theory, declaring that “the overall framework for understanding political development presented here bears many resemblances to biological evolution.” He acknowledges that there are “many important differences between biological and political evolution: human institutions are subject to deliberate design and choice, unlike genes; they are transmitted across time culturally rather than genetically: and they are invested with intrinsic value through a variety of social and psychological mechanisms, which makes them hard to change.” That is all very good, but it misses the main point about Darwinian evolution, which is that it is a process of drift, with no purpose or direction. If the development of human society is an evolutionary process, it is one that is going nowhere in particular. Actually, the idea of social evolution is not much more than an ill-chosen metaphor. As refined by later scientists, Darwin’s theory posits the natural selection of random genetic mutations. In contrast—despite all the fashionable chatter about memes—no one has come up with a unit of selection or a mechanism through which evolution operates in society. Judged by the standards of science, theories of social evolution are not theories at all.

This reminds me of an idea I encountered in college that sticks with me far better than most. The sociologist Georgi Derluguian taught two of three quarters of a required sequence for international studies majors, “Introduction to World Systems.” At the time, I didn’t know just how marginal the Immanuel Wallerstein school of historical sociology seems to many thinkers. (I stay out of this debate, myself.)

All quibbles with Wallerstein aside, Derluguian left a deep impression that I’ve stuck to through much later reading. Teleology in social analysis, the conviction that human events happen on a unilinear path toward some more developed state, represents what he called “steamrolling the copious bush of life.” Evolution is a good metaphor for social and institutional change precisely because it is non-linear.

This, he said, was a point taken from Stephen Jay Gould, the evolutionary scientist famous for writing in a way that can be understood by mere mortals. (As it happens, a search for “copious bush of life” gives us Derluguian’s book.)

It’s unfortunate, I think, that this kind of thinking is marginal in U.S. social science. More attention should be paid to the problematic metaphor of “science” in studying society. If only the study of “history” would allow a more thorough consideration of the present and very recent past.

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China–Japan maritime arrests: to care or not to care?

After China’s stern reaction last year to the arrest of a Chinese sailor who rammed Japanese ships near islands disputed by the two countries, the world media has braced itself for another round of “tensions” following a new arrest.

The fact that both Japanese and Chinese authorities are calling the incident a “regular fisheries case” is reassuring. This arrest, however, was different.

The arrest last year took place near the islands known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China that have been a long-standing point of contention between the two countries. Activists in both countries have mobilized to claim sovereignty. To make things more complicated, Taiwanese protesters have also staked claims.

This year’s incident took place in a far less sensitive area, near the Gotō Islands (or 五島). No one disputes these islands to my knowledge, and they are far closer to Japan’s larger islands, off the coast near Nagasaki.

The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, on the other hand, are closer to Taiwan than to the major Japanese islands, and they have been disputed for decades.

In the map below, Senkaku/Diaoyu is indicated with a red marker:


View Larger Map

This map Gotō is indicated:


View Larger Map

We’re left with media reports that generally don’t bother with the fact that the newer arrest took place in an undisputed territory very near Japan’s core area whereas the first took place near a hotly disputed territory far closer to the Chinese mainland or Taiwan than to most of Japan’s population.

It would seem to signify stability (or signify nothing) that both governments agree to follow ordinary law about this particular encounter. As far as I can tell, there is nothing odd here; this should be a routine case. It would be a story if and only if there was a hot-headed reaction.

This comes down to expectations. The people who think this non-event is a story are working with the assumption that either China would react “irrationally” or that enough people would expect a disproportionate response that covering the lack of it would be news.

That expectation of hotheadedness despite the material difference of circumstances strikes me as fairly well irrational on its own. Notice that the sources of the strange speculative stories are places like AFP and BBC, not Xinhua or Yomiuri. That both governments are settled with this, and no noticeable public outcry has resulted, should be signs that the foreign press is trolling the waters of conflict instead of covering life as it actually is.

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Ma Jun and the motivation boomerang: clever environmental advocacy

This evening I went to an event discussing human rights and the environment in China.* The big draw was Ma Jun, one of the most recognized names in Chinese environmental protection and the director of the Institute for Public & Environmental Affairs (IPE / 公众环境研究中心).

Ma Jun, 7 November 2011, New York City

Ma is a key figure in the movement for environmental protection, protection of humans from contaminated materials, and open information as a means to an end. He argues for a pragmatic mode of working in China that prioritizes outcomes over ideal processes.

That is to say, the democracy-oriented idealists in the crowd were at times unhappy with the approach that Ma describes as using “leverage” from areas where NGOs can operate to bring pressure to bear on areas where they might otherwise have little power. Asked by an audience member whether more direct challenges to the government might be more productive, he said, “We could better engage the government working in this way [i.e. by gathering and publishing information] than by some other channels.”

Other channels, such as direct litigation against polluters (or even the government), are not unheard of. Zhang Jingjing‘s work with the Center for Legal Assistance for Pollution Victims and other clients shows that litigation can work in some cases. But even more direct challenges, such as protesting outside factories, Ma said, are just not “sustainable.”

That’s what Ma described as the goal, and the progress seems significant. Ma and his colleagues do several kinds of work. In several areas, they collect and aggregate government data about environmental violations, then make it available online. This information empowers consumers and firms elsewhere in the supply chain to use government-produced data to make decisions.

Another kind of work is the aggregation and publication of public data on water quality and other environmental factors. This data is then added to a map-based database, and Google Earth is used to pinpoint polluters.

A third kind of work is perhaps the most interesting to systemic thinkers. This team’s work depends heavily on the availability of government statistics. As any China researcher knows, there are endless volumes of official statistics—if only you can get your hands on them. Luckily, Chinese law over the last three years or so has begun to require open information in a variety of circumstances, but adherence to the open information policies varies.

Ma’s group and a team from the Natural Resources Defense Council (Disclosure: I was a consultant to NRDC in 2008) have developed a Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI). It’s exactly what it sounds like. Researchers request environmental information and rate the openness with which localities respond. After a few years, the ratings are generally rising, Ma said. This is progress measured, and it’s another decision making tool for businesspeople seeking out localities or individual firms to do business with.

All of this activity falls under what Ma called the need for “motivation” among polluters to improve. Information is thought to help decrease environmental and human costs by: (1) getting information about the problem out in the open; (2) providing information that allows newly informed decision makers discriminate based on environmental performance; thereby (3) bringing the market to bear on costs that would otherwise be externalized. This “boomerang” effect, one hopes, could be quite effective.

It’s not all so easy, you might say.

Andrew J. Nathan, the Columbia political scientist famous for, among other things, helping get the Tiananmen Papers published, asked a seminar discussant’s battery of questions. The most interesting for me, given the trials of doing social science using Chinese government data, was whether the data Ma and his team base their work on is any good.

“The quality, I would say, is troublesome,” Ma answered. Local authorities have all kinds of incentives to fudge numbers. But for the purposes of the motivation-producing boomerang effect above, accuracy takes a back seat to impact. Who cares if the numbers are half as bad as reality when even the falsified numbers can shake people into action and greater awareness?

This is the sort of pragmatic advocacy that one really has to admire. Direct challenges to authority or powerful interests in China are often futile and sometimes dangerous. As much as some people would like to institute a liberal democratic regime, someone should meanwhile be working on making things better in the actually existing world.

Ma previewed yet another information-based lever that could help investors with an ethical motivation put their money where their mind is. In several months, he said, IPE and a collaborator will release a website that allows anyone to look up a stock symbol listed in China or Hong Kong and immediately receive a report about environmental performance. Ethical investors, however uncertain their numbers, need information to make ethical decisions.

Chinese environmental advocacy will certainly require a diversity of tactics, but after an evening hearing Ma Jun describe his, I think it’s a particularly contemporary and strategic mode of work. While discontented with the status quo, these efforts nonetheless avoid the identity of the protester. In social movement theoretical terms, it’s hard even to say that the strategy is fully a form of “claims making” or “contention.” Instead, it’s an effort to tweak half-baked processes before they set and channel already existing incentives toward new goals.

* The event was put on by the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, an organization that appears to work for “corporate social responsibility,” but that particular phrase was notably absent from the evening’s discussion.

Another side note: I was delighted to hear NRDC President Frances Beineke say on China: “I often think when I go there that we have outsourced our pollution there.” This is a turn of phrase I’ve been interested in for a long time.

[Edited for typos Jan 2, 2012.]

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Zhu Rongji’s diplomatic rants

Ella Chou has translated part of the recently published four-volume collection of materials on Zhu Rongji. Here’s a great rant, and go read some more.

ZHU: (Reminded the Americans that China made concession even before April on the agricultural sector.) You come here this time, saying U.S. is making an unprecedented compromise; China is not responding correspondingly; and you are throwing tantrums all over this. I’ll make one point: you don’t know how much concession we’ve made in agriculture. I am blamed by the people in the entire country for this, do you know that?

I reiterate that I will never back away from the concession we’ve made in agriculture, but if we cannot reach an agreement this time, we will never ever make any compromise on the agricultural front!
(On the Two 51% issue — share of foreign investment in telecommunication and insurance industries) I still think that the “two 51%” issue is not a big problem. I have said this again and again, and to Mr. Summers too, blowing an agreement for a couple of percentage is very stupid. The percentage of foreign investment in insurance companies we have approve so far is as high as 49% sometimes, and sometimes 50%, sometimes even 51%; you could check to see what difference it makes? Not at all! Even for those with 49%, it could be managed by the foreign partner. That’s why the couple of percentages don’t make any actual difference. But why are we insisting on this? Not to go back on our words, but the situation has changed. First of all, it’s because you shouldn’t bomb our Embassy in Yugoslavia… Chinese have always thought that the telecommunication and insurance industries are of vital interests [to the nation]. They think that if I agree to 51%, I’m selling out China’s interests – even though I don’t think so. From there on, a rumor is spreading in and outside of China that “Zhu Rongji is going to quit; [he] is going out of office.” That’s a complete unfounded. But the truth is I’m criticized by all sides. Such criticism comes from the people – they don’t understand the real situation. You don’t understand our  public opinion. If I’m not in China, but in the U.S., I would be out of office long ago. Now I have to stick to the “two 51%” in order not to fail the entire population. So I’m happy that you no longer insist on the “two 51%” issue, though it doesn’t have any practical impact, you indeed helped me out on this one. You could tell your insurance industry people that 51 or 50% aren’t really different. I have more friends in the American insurance industry than you do. There is not one big insurance company that I do not know; they’ve all come to me before. They’ll understand.
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China’s more ‘constructive’ and ‘outspoken’ role on Afghanistan

A report emerged today that China is taking a more active role in international discussions about the situation in Afghanistan. This minor diplomatic news is a case study in China’s role in the international community.

Reuters reports that Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin made an uncharacteristically forward statement at an Istanbul conference, compared with what the reporters call China’s “wait-and-see stance” with regard to Afghanistan.

“The international community must support an Afghanistan run by the Afghans,” Liu said.

“We must pledge to respect Afghanistan’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, to respect the dignity and rights of its government and people to be masters of their own country.”

This note of sovereignty and territorial integrity is familiar, and resonates with Amitai Etzioni’s recent argument in Foreign Affairs (paywall) that China has become a champion of Westphalian sovereignty in an era when many other countries are pushing a liberal international order that could be said to compromise sovereignty.

I find it interesting that, despite the strong note of national self-determination and strong sovereignty, anonymous “senior Western diplomats” welcome a more active Chinese role in the discussion over Afghanistan. Some of their comments from the Reuters article:

  • “They realize that a policy of further being on the wings, watching what goes on and ready to pick up things, isn’t good enough.”
  • “They were very vocal and raised several issues during the drafting. We weren’t even allowed to begin the final version until the Chinese delegation had arrived.”
  • “Before, you would attend meetings on Afghanistan and the neighbours would be silent, and here you have them taking a lead and that’s what it is all about.” … ”The Chinese for the first time were very comprehensive and constructive, you could really see an elevated role of China in the region and more outspoken than ever before.”

That last quote, of course, manages to be happy about China’s “constructive” role while still sounding the note of a Chinese rise: “more outspoken than ever.”

The world is going to have to deal with this combination in every area. If you want a “responsible stakeholder” out of a country with unique interests and great influence, you’re going to have to deal with an “outspoken” colleague.

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